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Actions Speak Louder Than Words: When
Should Courts Find that Institutions have a
Duty to Protect Minor Children from Sexual
Abuse?
Emily C. Hoskins
INTRODUCTION
“Our greatest responsibility as members of a civilized society
is our common goal of safeguarding our children, our chief legacy,
so they may grow to their full potential and can, in time, take our
places in the community at large.”1
It is hard to disagree with this statement, and rightfully so.
Minor children are one of the most vulnerable classes of people, yet
when it comes to ensuring their safety against sexual abuse, the
courts, the legislature, and society as a whole, have utterly failed
them. Nearly sixty years ago, the court acknowledged sexual
molestation and assault by third parties was a foreseeable crime for
which children involved in youth programs should be protected.2 Yet
here we are as a society, decades later, still dealing with continuous
allegations of sexual abuse, like those lodged against USA
Gymnastics doctor, Larry Nassar. The stories of abuse are horrifying,
and the lifelong effects on the young children who suffered the abuse
are even worse. Instead of working to solve the problem on an
institutional level, these youth programs are spending countless
hours and millions of dollars attempting to dodge all responsibility.
They argue as institutions—designed to improve and benefit the lives
of young children—they owe no duty to protect those young children
involved in their programs. What is even more disheartening than
the fact that institutions are still making these arguments, is the fact
that they are getting away with it.
 J.D. Candidate, Expected May 2021, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School
of Law. Thank you to my faculty advisor, Professor Jenny Carey, for her guidance and
confidence in my writing. Also, thank you to my family for supporting me and always
believing in me. A special thank you to the women of the Chapman Law Review, who have
encouraged me and inspired me throughout this process. Last, thank you to all the brave
women and children who have come forward about their abuse. Without them,
accountability and change may never happen.
1 Juarez v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 33 (Ct. App. 2000)
(emphasis added).
2 See Wallace v. Der-Ohanian, 18 Cal. Rptr. 892, 896 (Ct. App. 1962).
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There is no shortage of literature on the drastic and lifelong
impacts sexual abuse has on a minor child.3 The impacts of
childhood sexual abuse are also felt by the legal field, as the
effects of childhood sexual abuse have served as the basis of
many legal and policy driven pieces.4 For example, many
academics have written advocating for the importance of an
extended statute of limitations when it comes to cases of
childhood sexual abuse.5 Additionally, many papers have
explored the types of claims survivors of childhood sexual abuse
can bring against the institutions that played a role in their
abuse.6 One theory of liability, based on the existence of a special
relationship, has been explored in the context of school districts,
psychotherapists, and police officers.7 This Article will also focus
on the issue of special relationships, but under the lens of youth
sports and recreation organizations. Many articles have recently
been published regarding the liability of sports organizations for
abuse of their athletes, in part due to the very public scandals
within the United States Olympic Committee (“USOC”) and its
National Governing Bodies (“NGB”).8 However, these articles

3 See, e.g., Damyan Edwards, Childhood Sexual Abuse and Brain Development: A
Discussion of Associated Structural Changes and Negative Psychological Outcomes, 27
CHILD ABUSE REV. 198 (2018); Abdul Wohab & Sanzida Akhter, The Effects of Childhood
Sexual Abuse on Children’s Psychology and Employment, 5 PROCEDIA – SOC. & BEHAV.
SCIS. 144 (2010); Gaon et al., Dissociative Symptoms as a Consequence of Traumatic
Experiences: The Long-Term Effects of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 50(1) ISR. J. OF
PSYCHIATRY & RELATED SCIS. 17 (2013); Buzi et al., The Relationship Between Adolescent
Depression and a History of Sexual Abuse, 42(168) ADOLESCENCE 679 (2007).
4 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Wilson, Suing for Lost Childhood: Child Sexual Abuse, the
Delayed Discovery Rule, and the Problem of Finding Justice for Adult-Survivors of Child
Abuse, 12 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 145 (2003); Lois A. Weithorn, A Constitutional
Jurisprudence of Children’s Vulnerability, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 179 (2017).
5 See, e.g., Gregory G. Gordon, Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse and
Statute of Limitations: The Need for Consistent Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule,
20 PEPP. L. REV. 1359 (1993); Erin Khorram, Crossing the Limit Line: Sexual Abuse and
Whether Retroactive Application of Civil Statutes of Limitation are Legal, 16 U.C. DAVIS J.
JUV. L. & POL’Y 391 (2012).
6 See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Vicarious Liability in Torts: The Sex Exception, 48
VAL. U. L. REV. 133 (2003); Joseph B. Conder, Annotation, Liability of Church or Religious
Society for Sexual Misconduct of Clergy, 5 A.L.R. 5th 530 (1992); Catherine Blumenfeld,
C.A. v. William S. Hart Union School District: California’s Shift in Vicarious Liability
Leaves School Districts with No Protection, comment, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 883 (2014).
7 See, e.g., Anita Binayifaal, Reexamining School Liability and the Viability of a
Special Relationship Claim in the Aftermath of Deshaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1071 (2013); Calista Menzhuber, In
the Absence of Parents: Expanding Liability for Caretaker’s Failure to Protect Minors from
Third-Party Harm – Bjerke v. Johnson, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 714 (2009); Susanna M.
Kim, Section 1983 Liability in the Public Schools After Deshaney: The “Special
Relationship” Between School and Student, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1101 (1994).
8 See, e.g., Alexandria Murphy, Better Late Than Never: Why the USOC Took So
Long to Fix a Failing System for Protecting Olympic Athletes from Abuse, 26 JEFFREY S.
MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 157 (2019); Maureen A. Weston, Tackling Abuse in Sport Through
Dispute System Design, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 434 (2017); Daniel Fiorenza, Blacklisted:
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mainly focus on actions taken outside of the courtroom to fix
problems of sexual abuse within organizations. This Article fills
the gap in the literature by analyzing the law of negligence,
specifically the duty arising from a special relationship and other
policy considerations, and using it to simplify and enunciate a
test which should be used to determine when a duty exists.
In 2019, a case was certified for appeal to the Supreme Court
of California involving minor athletes who were sexually abused
by their coach while participating in a youth sports program
sanctioned by USOC and one of its NGBs.9 In that case, the court
is tasked with answering the question of when an institution has a
duty to protect a minor child participating in its program from
sexual abuse by a third party.10 In previous cases involving sexual
abuse within institutions, the courts analyzed one set of factors
indicating the existence of a special relationship and analyzed a
separate set of factors as policy considerations. After reviewing
negligence law and the cases interpreting it in California, to
determine whether or not to impose a duty, the court should
analyze only the factors of (1) the dependence of the child on the
institution for protection, (2) the control the institution has over
the means of protection, and (3) the burden on the institution and
consequences to the community of imposing a duty, with the rest
of the policy factors automatically weighing in favor of imposing a
duty. This test will be easier for courts to apply, thereby improving
judicial efficiency. Additionally, it will lead to more consistent and
predictable results.
The outcome of the Brown v. USA Taekwondo case and the
standard used to impose, or not impose a duty, will have profound
effects not only on survivors of sexual abuse bringing lawsuits, but
also on how institutions behave and structure themselves. In
recognizing the higher likelihood that a duty will be imposed under
this test, the institutions will do everything they can to act
reasonably instead of everything they can to avoid liability. For
years institutions have been able to escape liability by turning a
blind eye to the sexual abuse committed by their members and
happening within their programs. Hundreds of brave survivors of
sexual abuse have come forward to share their stories and to hold
those who are responsible accountable. If nothing else, this paper

Safe Sport’s Disciplinary Policy Restrains a Coach’s Livelihood, 27 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
113 (2016); Haley O. Morton, License to Abuse: Confronting Coach-Inflicted Sexual
Assault in American Olympic Sports, 23 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 142 (2016).
9 See Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 708, 715 (Ct. App. 2019).
10 While this article was in the editing process, the California Supreme Court
released its decision. See Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 11 Cal. 5th 204 (2021). The
implications of the Court’s decision are discussed below in Part IV.
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serves as a call to action. As a society, we cannot continue to just
talk about how much we care about protecting vulnerable children,
we must show them with our actions. The Supreme Court of
California had the opportunity to do precisely that.
Part I of this Article describes the rampant childhood sexual
abuse11 that is occurring in American institutions. It also
discusses recent legislative attempts to improve the safety of
children within these institutions and the legal actions survivors
of childhood sexual abuse have taken. Last, Part I discusses the
brief history of the Brown case, including the courts’ decisions at
both the trial and appellate level.
Part II begins with the question posed to the Supreme Court
of California in the Brown case. Part II then examines the law of
negligence in California state courts, specifically focusing on the
exception to the general rule that the existence of a special
relationship can create an affirmative duty to act.
Part III discusses the cases leading up to Brown,
concentrating solely on the special relationship argument
presented in those cases. This section highlights the
inconsistencies in the court’s analysis and the need for a
simplified and standardized test. Part III will also assess the
special relationship argument presented in Brown, reviewing the
court’s findings against USA Taekwondo (“USAT”) and USOC.
Part IV details and analyzes the decision of the Supreme
Court of California in Brown issued on April 1, 2021, including a
critique of its decision to not proceed to the policy factors if a
special relationship is not first established.
Part V describes a synthesized and simplified test a minor
plaintiff must satisfy to establish a defendant owed a duty to protect
the plaintiff from sexual abuse by a third party. This section will also
explain how prior court decisions align and are consistent with the
proposed test, suggesting the court was already using the proposed
factors as the vital considerations in its decisions. Last, Part V will
discuss the implications and benefits of the suggested test.
11 For purposes of this Article, “childhood sexual abuse” also refers to “childhood
sexual assault” as defined in California Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1. See CAL.
CODE CIV. PRO. § 340.1 (Deering, LEXIS through ch. 3 of the 2020 Reg. Sess.). The 2020
amendment to the statute changed the wording from childhood sexual abuse to childhood
sexual assault to expand the definition of conduct that would be included. See Nelson &
Schwebke, New California Law Allowing Childhood Sexual Assault Victims More Time to
Report Draws Widespread Praise, ORANGE CNTY. REG. (Oct. 14, 2019),
https://www.ocregister.com/2019/10/14/new-california-law-allowing-childhood-sexualassault-victims-more-time-to-report-draws-widespread-praise/
[http://perma.cc/8GJTM8CR]. For ease of understanding and consistency, and due to the use of the term
“childhood sexual abuse” in prior case law, “childhood sexual abuse” will be used
throughout this paper.
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I. BACKGROUND
“The ripple effect of our actions—or inactions—can be
enormous, spanning generations. Perhaps the greatest tragedy of
this nightmare is that it could have been avoided. Predators
thrive in silence.”12 These words were spoken as Aly Raisman,
Sarah Klein, and Tiffany Thomas Lopez, along with over 100
survivors of Larry Nassar’s decades of sexual abuse, filled the
ESPY’s stage to accept the Arthur Ashe Courage Award.13 These
“sister survivors”14 took a stand to bring awareness to the issue of
sexual abuse within sports organizations and call out the
institutions that silenced their allegations of abuse for years.15
But their story is just one of many. There have been complaints
of sexual misconduct against members and/or coaches in USA
Basketball, USA Boxing, USA Diving, US Equestrian Federation,
US Figure Skating, USA Gymnastics, USA Hockey, USA Rugby,
US Soccer, USA Swimming, USA Taekwondo, US Tennis
Association, USA Track and Field, USA Wrestling, and USA
Volleyball, to name a few.16 With more than 290 coaches and
officials in the United Sates facing accusations of sexual
misconduct and counting,17 it is clear these institutions are
“plac[ing] money and medals above the safety of child athletes.”18
However, sports institutions are not alone. Instances of
childhood sexual abuse and assault are occurring at alarming
rates, the actual magnitude of which may never be fully known.19
12 Aly Raisman, Address Accepting at the Excellence in Sports Performance Yearly
Awards (July 18, 2018) (accepting the Arthur Ashe Courage Award alongside dozens of
fellow athletes and sexual abuse survivors for bravery that transcends sports) (transcript
available at Cosmopolitan website).
13 Michelle R. Martinelli, Aly Raisman and 140 Abuse Survivors Unite for Powerful
ESPYS Moment, FOR THE WIN (July 19, 2018, 8:48 AM), https://ftw.usatoday.com/2018/07/alyraisman-espys-arthur-ashe-courage-award-abuse-nassar-survivors-powerful-video
[http://perma.cc/LHX5-EKDW].
14 Sarah Klein, Address Accepting at the Excellence in Sports Performance Yearly
Awards (July 18, 2018) (referring to the hundreds of women who survived years of sexual
abuse by Larry Nassar) (transcript available at Cosmopolitan website).
15 Martinelli, supra note 13.
16 See
Centralized
Disciplinary
Database,
U.S.
CTR.
FOR
SAFESPORT,
https://uscenterforsafesport.org/response-and-resolution/disciplinary-database/
[http://perma.cc/V6PK-LJF5] (last visited Apr. 29, 2020). This list is not exhaustive and does
not include instances of sexual misconduct where the survivor has yet to come forward. See id.
17 See Murphy, supra note 8, at 158.
18 Klein, supra note 14.
19 See
Child
Abuse
Statistics,
CTR.
FOR
FAM.
JUST.,
https://centerforfamilyjustice.org/community-education/statistics/ [http://perma.cc/D2PM-YMMZ]
(last visited Apr. 29, 2020) (explaining that roughly “1 in 3 girls and 1 in 7 boys will be sexually
assaulted by the time they reach 18,” according to the Department of Justice); Child Sexual Abuse
Statistics: The Magnitude of the Problem, DARKNESS TO LIGHT (Dec. 22, 2015),
http://www.d2l.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Statistics_1_Magnitude.pdf
[http://perma.cc/QJC9-3D7J] (finding the magnitude of the problem of childhood sexual abuse is
largely unknown due to the fact that only about 38% of child victims disclose their sexual abuse).

Do Not Delete

492

5/17/2021 12:13 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 24:2

Over the past few decades, many trusted institutions have
become the center of allegations involving rampant and
uninhibited sexual abuse of vulnerable children.20 Sexual abuse
within religious institutions is a worldwide problem.21 Most
notably, this centuries-old problem characterized by cover-ups
and lack of accountability has placed the Catholic Church under
international scrutiny.22 Additionally, sexual abuse is repeatedly
occurring in schools and other children’s recreation programs,
leaving countless children to cope with the lifelong effects of
abuse.23 As an illustration, an investigation in the 1990s revealed
the Boy Scouts of America have reported, “on average, more than
one incident of sexual abuse per week for the past two decades”
not including the number of unreported cases.24
Childhood sexual abuse is not simply a problem of abusive
individuals but a problem of systematic failures within
institutions25—institutions that failed to take action to
adequately protect the children they were entrusted to care for.26
Chamallas, supra note 6, at 133.
See Child Sexual Abuse in the Catholic Church, CHILD RTS. INT’L NETWORK,
https://home.crin.org/issues/sexual-violence/child-sexual-abuse-catholic-church
[http://perma.cc/5D6W-FP3V] (last visited Apr. 29, 2020).
22 Id.
23 See, e.g., LAUSD Agrees to Multimillion-Dollar Settlement of Child Sex Abuse
Claims Against Ex-Teachers, ABC 7 EYEWITNESS NEWS (Jan. 16, 2020),
https://abc7.com/child-sex-abuse-sexual-misconduct-lausd-los-angeles-unified-schooldistrict/5855667/ [http://perma.cc/24W9-X82E] (questioning the Los Angeles Board of
Education’s steps “to reform a culture which places the reputation of the district and its
employees above the safety of children in its care” after paying out more than $300
million in settlement of sexual abuse cases); Joe Nelson, Redlands Unified Slapped with
Sex Abuse Lawsuit Under New State Law, REDLANDS DAILY FACTS (Jan. 23, 2020, 3:01
PM), https://www.redlandsdailyfacts.com/2020/01/21/redlands-unified-slapped-with-sexabuse-lawsuit-under-new-state-law/ [http://perma.cc/4WMP-JUCK] (exposing 20 years of
covering up sexual abuse by teachers in the district); Cara Kelly, Boy Scouts Face a ‘Flood
of Litigation’ Over Child Sexual Abuse, USA TODAY (Jan. 7, 2020, 1:17 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2020/01/06/boy-scouts-hit-morelawsuits-claiming-child-sex-abuse/2806124001/
[http://perma.cc/9VFD-MFF9]
(“Boy
Scouts of America faces mounting legal liability as lawsuits alleging sexual abuse by
leaders and volunteers continue to roll in.”); Carter Sherman, Hundreds of Kids Across
the Country Were Abused at Boys & Girls Clubs of America, Report Reveals, VICE (Aug.
15, 2019, 9:57 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/mbma98/hundreds-of-kids-acrossthe-country-were-abused-at-boys-and-girls-clubs-of-america-report-reveals
[http://perma.cc/8HS3-SE2F] (“More than 200 people across 30 states say that they were
sexually abused as children by people with ties to the Boys & Girls Clubs of America,
which serves more than 4 million children as the nation’s largest youth development
nonprofit.”).
24 See Mark C. Lear, Just Perfect for Pedophiles? Charitable Organizations that Work
with Children and Their Duty to Screen Volunteers, 76 TEX. L. REV. 143, 144 n.8 (1997);
Patrick Boyle, Scout’s Honor: Scouting’s Sex Abuse Trail Leads to 50 States, WASH. TIMES,
May 20, 1991, at A1 (finding sex abuse by scout leaders more common than the amount of
accidental deaths and serious injuries to youth scouts combined).
25 See Chamallas, supra note 6, at 133.
26 Jennifer Shore, Institutional Sex Abuse of Children: Part 1: The Scope of the
Problem, FOCUS FOR HEALTH (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.focusforhealth.org/institutional20
21
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Sex abuse rises to the level of institutional abuse when the
organization and institutional structure these individuals are
affiliated with does not respond appropriately to allegations when
they come forward. . . . In all these cases, the actions of the predator
were either ignored or accepted by the institution, and the focus of the
system shifted to covering up the allegation to avoid scandal and
preserve the institution itself instead of protecting children. The
collective inaction of the institution allowed the abuse to continue and
more children became victimized. When abuse occurs to children in
the very settings that are designed to enhance their lives and to
protect them, it is especially egregious and difficult to understand. We
no longer have one sexual deviant to blame for the exploitation of a
child, but an entire system that has allowed for the abuse to continue,
and in the process, enabled more children to be victimized.27

The destructive impacts of childhood sexual abuse on
children are undeniable.28 Children who are sexually abused
suffer immediate impacts as well as long term consequences.29
Some immediate impacts of childhood sexual abuse include lower
self-esteem, depression, anxiety, guilt, shame, anger, sleep
disturbances, lack of trust, and withdrawn behavior.30
Unfortunately, these problems do not simply disappear when the
abuse stops. Victims of childhood sexual abuse are more likely to
develop substance abuse problems, develop mental health
problems including anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress
disorder and eating disorders, encounter problems with authority
including law enforcement, and have problems with intimacy and
sexual relationships.31
Action must be taken to prevent institutions from
continually failing to protect defenseless and vulnerable children.
Allegations must be taken seriously, and children must be
believed. It is not enough to address issues of childhood sexual
abuse after they have already occurred. But how do we compel
institutions to take allegations of sexual abuse seriously? What
proactive and preemptive measures can be taken to safeguard
children before the abuse ever occurs? Should this problem be left
up to the legislators to decide? At both a federal and state level,
sex-abuse-of-children-part-1-scope-of-the-problem/ [http://perma.cc/JC52-98T2].
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 See
Effects,
NAT’L
CHILD
TRAUMATIC
STRESS
NETWORK,
https://www.nctsn.org/what-is-child-trauma/trauma-types/sexual-abuse/effects
[http://perma.cc/PRH8-K9XB] (last visited May 1, 2020).
30 See id.; Immediate and Lasting Effects, RACE AGAINST ABUSE OF CHILD.
EVERYWHERE, raace.org/immediate-lasting-effects [http://perma.cc/79L9-6T57] (last
visited May 1, 2020).
31 See Effects, supra note 29; Long Term Consequences of Child Sexual Abuse,
DARKNESS TO LIGHT (Jan. 2017), https://www.d2l.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/LongTerm-Consequences-4.11.14.pdf [http://perma.cc/7YKD-KJ5U].
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the United States is recognizing the need to take action to protect
children from sexual abuse. For example, in 2018, the Safe Sport
Authorization Act was enacted to improve protection for young
athletes, including the creation of the United States Center for
SafeSport as an independent entity that investigates reports of
abuse in Olympic programs.32 In addition, multiple states have
recently extended their statute of limitations33 and made
necessary updates to the laws governing childhood sexual abuse
claims, in recognition of delays in reporting and other hurdles
attributed to the nature of this type of abuse.34 Specifically,
California’s Assembly Bill 218 extended the time to bring a claim
of childhood sexual assault to twenty-two years after the adult
survivor reaches the age of majority.35 Moreover, it revived
previously time barred claims that had not been litigated to
finality for a period of three years.36 Time and again, the state of
California has recognized its compelling interest in protecting
citizens, particularly those most vulnerable, like minor children,
from the devastation of such atrocious crimes as sexual assault
and molestation.37
While the changes in law represent a step in the right
direction, these changes will be meaningless unless they impact
and alter the behavior of the institutions that are continuing to
allow childhood sexual abuse to take place. Since these
institutions have repeatedly prioritized money and reputation
over children’s safety, it appears that impacting an institution’s
reputation and finances may be the precise motivation needed to
improve child safety measures and precautions within the
institutions. Survivors of childhood sexual abuse have instituted
civil actions against their perpetrators and the institutions that
32 Protecting Young Victims from Sexual Abuse and Safe Sport Authorization Act of
2017, Pub. L. No. 115–126, 132 Stat. 318 (2018).
33 Statute
of Limitations, CAL. CTS.: THE JUD. BRANCH OF CAL.,
https://www.courts.ca.gov/9618.htm?rdeLocaleAttr=en [http://perma.cc/JM8H-SVJB] (last
visited Apr. 30, 2020) (“A statute of limitations is the deadline for filing a lawsuit. Most
lawsuits MUST be filed within a certain amount of time. In general, once the statute of
limitations on a case ‘runs out,’ the legal claim is not valid any longer. The period of time
during which you can file a lawsuit varies depending on the type of legal claim.”).
34 See S.B. 2440, 242nd Ann. Legis. Sess., Ch. 11 (N.Y. 2019) (allowing childhood
sexual abuse victims to seek civil action against their abusers and institutions that
enabled them until they turn age 55); S.B. 477, P.L. 2019, Ch. 120 (N.J. 2019) (extending
the statute of limitations in civil actions for childhood sexual abuse and creating a twoyear window for civil lawsuits that would otherwise be time barred even under the new
statute of limitations); Assemb. B. 218, 2019-2020 Ch. 861 (Cal. 2019) (expanding the
definition of childhood sexual assault, extending the statute of limitations, broadening
notice requirements, and reviving previously time barred claims).
35 Assemb. B. 218 (resulting in any person under the age of forty (40), age of majority
(18) plus twenty-two (22) years, able to bring a claim of childhood sexual assault).
36 Id.
37 Burt v. County of Orange, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373, 382 (Ct. App. 2004).
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were supposed to be protecting them in the hopes that significant
monetary and reputational losses will inspire better childcare
procedures and safeguards.
Under the recently updated California Code of Civil
Procedure section 340.1, a person can bring a civil action for the
recovery of damages suffered as a result of sexual abuse for the
following:
(1) An action against any person for committing an act of childhood
sexual assault.
(2) An action for liability against any person or entity who owed a
duty of care to the plaintiff, if a wrongful or negligent act by that
person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that
resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(3) An action for liability against any person or entity if an intentional
act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual
assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.38

While many theories of liability have been advanced in
California state courts against institutions, this paper will focus
on a theory of negligence based on an affirmative duty created by
the special relationship between the institution and the child
who was the victim of sexual abuse, or the special relationship
between the institution and the perpetrator of the sexual abuse.39

CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 340.1 (Deering, LEXIS through ch. 3 of the 2020 Reg. Sess.).
There are many other theories of liability survivors of sexual assaults use in civil
lawsuits including, but not limited to: vicarious liability, direct liability through
negligence, intentional torts, agency, and premises liability. California courts have held
institutions vicariously liable for sexual misconduct committed by their employees in
some situations, but not in others. See John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d
948, 956–57 (Cal. 1989) (finding the school district was not vicariously liable for its
teacher’s act of sexually assaulting a student while the student was participating in a
district sanctioned extracurricular activity at the teacher’s home); White v. County. of
Orange, 212 Cal. Rptr. 493, 496 (Ct. App. 1985) (finding a police officer who sexually
assaults a member of the community while on duty carries with them the authority of the
law, and when the wrongful acts flow from that exercise of authority, the employer (the
government) must be held responsible). Additionally, California courts have held
institutions directly liable for their employee’s negligence. See C.A. v. William S. Hart
Union High Sch. Dist., 270 P.3d 699, 702 (Cal. 2012) (finding the employer liable for the
negligence of supervisory and/or administrative employees who knew or should have
known of the sexually abusive employee’s propensities and nevertheless hired, retained,
or inadequately supervised that employee). Survivors of sexual abuse have attempted to
bring claims of premises liability, intentional torts, and claims based on agency, but have
not always been successful. See Juarez v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 17
(Ct. App. 2000) (affirming summary judgement for the defendants on an action for
premises liability); Boy Scouts of Am. Nat’l Found. v. Superior Ct., 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 819,
833–34 (Ct. App. 2012) (finding a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was
time barred under the applicable statute of limitations); Doe v. Roman Cath. Archbishop
of L.A., 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 414, 426 (Ct. App. 2016) (asserting “a principal may be liable for
the wrongful conduct of its agent, even if that conduct is criminal, in one of three ways”).
38
39
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In the 2019 Brown case, three young women sued their coach
for sexually abusing them while they were minor children.40 They
also sued USAT and USOC for their inaction and negligence in
failing to protect the minor girls from the coach’s sexual abuse.41
The trial court dismissed the minor plaintiffs’ claims against
USAT and USOC.42 On review, the Court of Appeal of California
found USAT was in a special relationship with the coach that
sexually abused the plaintiffs, thus USAT owed the plaintiffs a
duty to act affirmatively to protect them.43 In contrast, the court
found USOC did not owe the plaintiffs a duty because it did not
have a special relationship with the sexually abusive coach or
with the plaintiffs.44 The plaintiffs petitioned for review which
the Supreme Court of California granted.45
II. THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION IN CALIFORNIA
NEGLIGENCE LAW
The issue in the Brown case presents a question of duty: when
do institutions have a duty to protect minor children from sexual
abuse by third parties?46 In order to answer that question, a
discussion of negligence, specifically focusing on the element of duty
is necessary.
The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) the existence
of a duty on the part of the actor toward another to take action to
protect against risk; (2) the failure on the part of the actor to conform
to a required standard of conduct in light of the duty imposed; (3) a
reasonably close connection between the conduct and the resulting
injury, commonly called “proximate cause”; and (4) actual loss or
damage resulting from such injury.47

A. Duty as a Necessary Element of Negligence
A duty is a legally recognized obligation requiring an actor to
follow a standard of conduct for the safety of others against

Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 708, 715 (Ct. App. 2019).
Id. at 715–16.
Id. at 716.
Id.
Id.
Summary of Cases Accepted and Related Actions During Week of December 30,
2019, CAL. CTS. at 1 (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ws123019.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7G69-FA69] (press release).
46 Pending
Issues
Summary,
CAL.
CTS.
at
2,
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/MAY0820civpend.pdf
[http://perma.cc/HHX4-C7X2]
(last updated May 8, 2020).
47 See Koepke v. Loo, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34, 36 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, §30 at 164–65 (5th ed. 1984));
SHERYL L. HECKMANN & HOWARD C. ANAWALT, 1 CALIFORNIA TORTS §1.01, Westlaw
(database updated 2020).
40
41
42
43
44
45
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unreasonable risks.48 “A duty to do something for another person
or entity often creates a right in the other that the duty be
performed, and a breach of such a duty gives rise to a cause of
action for violation of the right.”49 The existence of a duty is
generally a question of law to be determined by the court.50 The
existence of a duty is not a “discoverable fact[] of nature, but
merely [a] conclusory expression[] that, in cases of a particular
type, liability should be imposed for damage done.”51 In many
cases, a duty may be obvious.52 But the issue of duty in a legal
context may arise when a defendant insists that he or she was
under no legal obligation to act carefully.53 As will be discussed
infra, a duty is a judicial determination that a person is liable to
another person who was injured, based on a variety of policy
considerations.54
In California, there is a general duty to exercise reasonable
care under the circumstances.55 California has codified its
general duty in California Civil Code Section 1714(a), which
states:
Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful
acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of
ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or
person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary
care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.56

This is a very broad rule requiring every person to exercise
reasonable care to avoid causing injury to every other person.57
However, a person will not be held liable for a failure to act to
protect or aid another who is imperiled by the circumstances, by
that person’s own actions, or by the actions of a third party.58
48 HECKMANN & ANAWALT, supra note 47, §1.02; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, §30 at 164 (5th ed. 1984); see Peter W. v. S.F. Unified

Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 859 (Ct. App. 1976).
49 Duty, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (2012) (desk edition).
50 See HECKMANN & ANAWALT, supra note 47, § 1.02; Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859;
Raymond v. Paradise Unified Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. Rptr. 847, 851 (Ct. App. 1963); Cabral v.
Ralphs Grocery Co., 248 P.3d 1170, 1175 (Cal. 2011) (stating the determination of a duty
owed is for the court to make, but the determination of whether the defendant breached
that duty is for the jury in a jury trial to make).
51 Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 732 (Cal. 1980) (emphasis added)
(citing Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976)).
52 See HECKMANN & ANAWALT, supra note 47, § 1.02 (indicating no judge would
welcome lengthy argument regarding automobile drivers owing a duty to other drivers
and pedestrians on the road, since the duty owed is very clear).
53 Id.; CHARLES O. GREGORY & HARRY KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
260 (2d ed. 1969).
54 HECKMANN & ANAWALT, supra note 47, § 1.02.
55 Id.
56 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(a) (Deering 2020); HECKMANN & ANAWALT, supra note 47, § 1.02.
57 HECKMANN & ANAWALT, supra note 47, § 1.02.
58 Id. § 1.10 (“Generally, one was not held liable for his or her ‘mere’ nonfeasance.
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A person is not required to take affirmative action that benefits
another person unless there was some preexisting legal duty
obligating them to do so.59 Without a legal duty, any injury
suffered is said to be “damnum absque injuria” or an injury
without a wrong.60 This failure to act affirmatively where an
action is required is referred to as nonfeasance, and courts are
more reluctant to impose liability for nonfeasance as opposed to
malfeasance, or an affirmative act that causes injury.61 Despite
this reluctance, the courts have carved out exceptions to this
general rule.62 However, the Supreme Court of California has
declared that no exception should be made to this fundamental
principle, except if it is clearly supported by public policy.63
B. Factors for Determining if an Exception is Supported by
Public Policy
The Supreme Court of California recognized a duty as an
“expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy
which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled
to protection.”64 The court makes this determination on a case by
Nonfeasance generally refers to a person’s failure to act to protect or assist others who are
imperiled by the circumstances, by their own actions, or by the actions of a third party.”).
See Stout v. City of Porterville, 196 Cal. Rptr. 301, 304 (1983) (“As a rule, one has no duty
to come to the aid of another. A person who has not created a peril is not liable in tort
merely for failure to take affirmative action to assist or protect another unless there is
some relationship between them which gives rise to such a duty.”); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (AM. L. INST. 1965) (“The fact that the actor realizes or should
realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself
impose upon him a duty to take such action.”).
59 HECKMANN & ANAWALT, supra note 47, § 1.10.
60 E.g., Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church, 763 P.2d 948, 956 (Cal. 1988).
61 See Conti v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 37
(2015); Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343 n.5 (Cal. 1976), superseded
by statute, Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92 (Deering 2020) (attributing the reluctance to practical
difficulties in setting a workable rule for situations of nonfeasance).
62 Stout, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 304 (including exceptions when a person voluntarily
undertakes aiding another, where a special relationship exists, and when a person has
created a foreseeable peril). See, e.g., HECKMANN & ANAWALT, supra note 47, § 1.11
(stating that one who voluntarily renders aid or protection to another is under a duty to
exercise reasonable care); Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343 (finding that the relationship between
a patient and his psychotherapist may result in affirmative duties for the benefits of third
persons); Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352, 355 (Cal. 1968) (imposing a “duty upon those
who create a foreseeable peril, not readily discoverable by endangered persons, to warn
them of such potential peril”).
63 See HECKMANN & ANAWALT, supra note 47, § 1.02; Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d
561, 564 (Cal. 1968), superseded by statute, Cal. Civ. Code § 847 (West 2020), as
recognized in Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery, 968 P.2d 65 (Cal. 1998), (“Although it is true
that some exceptions have been made to the general principle that a person is liable for
injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances, it is clear
that in the absence of statutory provision declaring an exception to the fundamental
principle enunciated by section 1714 of the Civil Code, no such exception should be made
unless clearly supported by public policy.”).
64 See HECKMANN & ANAWALT, supra note 47, § 1.02; Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 539
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case analysis.65 In the landmark Supreme Court of California
case Rowland v. Christian, the plaintiff sued the defendant for a
severe injury to his hand sustained when the knob of the faucet
on the bathroom basin broke.66 The plaintiff argued that the
defendant knew of the dangerous condition presented by the
defective knob and owed him a duty to warn him of that danger.67
The court moved away from the rigid common law duties a
landowner owes to a trespasser, licensee, or invitee.68 Instead, in
determining the existence of a duty in that case, the court
observed there was no “statutory provision declaring an
exception to the fundamental principle enunciated by section
1714 of the Civil Code.”69 Consequently, an exception could only
exist if it was supported by public policy, which is determined by
an analysis of factors.70
To make this determination, the court balanced a number of
considerations including:
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing
future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care
with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.71

The factors generally fall into two categories, and the courts
often analyze the factors according to those groups.72 The first
group of factors involve foreseeability.73 This group includes the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, and the similar concepts of
certainty of injury and connection between the plaintiff’s injury
and the defendant.74 The second group of factors is concerned
P.2d 36, 39 (Cal. 1975) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 325–26 (4th ed.
1971)); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 916 (Cal. 1968).
65 HECKMANN & ANAWALT, supra note 47, § 1.02.
66 Rowland, 443 P.2d at 562. A separate analysis is discussed in this case involving
whether the injured person was classified as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee. Id. at 565.
However, this case’s relevance for the purpose of this paper only relates to the factors
considered to determine whether an exception to the general duty to exercise ordinary
care should be made.
67 Id. at 562.
68 Id. at 561.
69 Id. at 564.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 See Kesner v. Superior Ct., 384 P.3d 283, 291 (2016); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Superior Ct., 413 P.3d 656, 670 (Cal. 2018); Univ. of S. Cal. v. Superior Ct., 241 Cal. Rptr.
3d 616, 633 (Ct. App. 2018).
73 See Kesner, 384 P.3d at 291; Regents, 413 P.3d at 670; Univ. of S. Cal., 241 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 633.
74 See Kesner, 384 P.3d at 291; Regents, 413 P.3d at 670; Univ. of S. Cal., 241 Cal.
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with public policy.75 This group includes concerns of moral
blame,76 preventing future harm, burden, and insurance
availability.77 This policy analysis looks at whether certain kinds
of plaintiffs or certain kinds of injuries should be excluded from
relief.78
The foreseeability of the injury is the most important factor
“in determining whether to create an exception to the general
duty to exercise ordinary care.”79
In examining foreseeability, “the court’s task . . . ‘is not to decide
whether a particular plaintiff’s injury was reasonably foreseeable in
light of a particular defendant’s conduct, but rather to evaluate more
generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is
sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that
liability may appropriately be imposed . . . .’”80

Importantly, all factors are evaluated at a broad level of
generality—that is, “whether carving out an entire category of
cases from that general duty rule is justified by clear
considerations of policy.”81 No factor by itself is determinative, so
the courts must analyze each factor and weigh them against the
other factors to determine when a duty exists.82
Rptr. 3d at 633; cf. Bryant v. Glastetter, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291, 296–97 (Ct. App. 1995) (The
court found there was “no logical cause and effect relationship between the negligence and
the harm suffered by decedent except for the fact that it placed decedent in a position to
be acted upon by the negligent third party.” Thus, the connection between the plaintiff’s
injury and the defendant’s conduct weighed against finding the injury foreseeable, and
therefore, against the existence of a duty.).
75 See Kesner, 384 P.3d at 291; Regents, 413 P.3d at 670; Univ. of S. Cal., 241 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 633.
76 Moral blame usually refers to “evidence that a defendant knew or reasonably
should have known there was any danger or potential danger associated with that
defendant's act or failure to act.” See Butcher v. Gay, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 771, 780 (Ct. App.
1994) (imposing liability without some degree of moral blame on the defendant is like
imposing liability without fault). Moreover, any moral blame that is ordinarily associated
with negligence in general is not enough to tip the balance. See Adams v. City of Fremont,
80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 196, 212 (Ct. App. 1998) (requiring a higher degree of moral blame such
as intent or planning the harm, actual or constructive knowledge of the danger, reckless
indifference to consequences of one’s actions, or inherently harmful acts).
77 See Kesner, 384 P.3d at 291; Regents, 413 P.3d at 670; Univ. of S. Cal., 241 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 633.
78 See Kesner, 384 P.3d at 291; Regents, 413 P.3d at 670; Univ. of S. Cal., 241 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 633.
79 Regents, 413 P.3d at 670–71 (quoting Kesner, 384 P.3d at 291); see Tarasoff v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976). But cf. Parsons v. Crown Disposal
Co., 936 P.2d 70, 82 (Cal. 1997) (noting that the mere presence of foreseeability standing
alone is not sufficient to impose a duty and that public policy may dictate nonliability
despite how foreseeable the risk is); Adams, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211 (remarking that
almost any result is foreseeable with the benefit of hindsight, so the low bar of
foreseeability alone is insufficient to create a duty).
80 Regents, 413 P.3d at 670 (emphasis in original omitted).
81 Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 248 P.3d 1170, 1175 (Cal. 2011).
82 See, e.g., Parsons, 936 P.2d at 82 (holding that the factors of social utility of the
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C. The Special Relationship Exception to the General No Duty
to Protect Rule
One such exception to the general rule of liability that has
been developed through the common law is the special
relationship exception.83 This exception is stated in Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 315:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to
prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless (a) a
special relation exists between the actor and the third person which
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which
gives to the other a right to protection.84

The existence of a special relationship may result in the
imposition of an affirmative duty to protect an individual against
harm or injury by a third person.85 This affirmative duty can
include a duty to warn, a duty to control, or both.86 Specifically, a
duty to control can result if a defendant is in a “special
relationship with the foreseeably dangerous person,” and the
defendant has an ability to control that person’s conduct.87
Similarly, a duty to warn or protect exists if “the defendant has a
special relationship with the potential victim that gives the
victim a right to expect protection.”88 Deeming a relationship a
special relationship has no independent significance, it merely
signals that the court is recognizing an affirmative duty where no
duty to act would generally exist.89

conduct and the burden and consequences to the community outweighed the foreseeability
factor in that case); Juarez v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 33–34 (Ct. App.
2000) (resulting in a duty owed, despite the absence of any moral blame weighing strongly
as a factor against finding a duty).
83 HECKMANN & ANAWALT, supra note 47, § 1.10 (“[A] person may in some instances
be obligated to take certain affirmative steps to protect or aid another if that person
stands in some ‘special relationship’ to either the person endangered or the person whose
conduct may injure the person endangered.”); id. at §1.12 (“California courts have
recognized that ‘special relationships’ may create special duties, including the duty to
protect against the harmful acts of third persons.”); see, e.g., Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343
(finding a special relationship between a patient and a psychotherapist); Marois v. Royal
Investigation & Patrol, Inc., 208 Cal. Rptr. 384, 388 (Ct. App. 1984) (finding a special
relationship between a business and its customers).
84 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (AM. L. INST. 1965).
85 See HECKMANN & ANAWALT, supra note 47, § 1.12.
86 Id.; see Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 346; Marois, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 387–88.
87 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Ct., 413 P.3d 656, 664 (Cal. 2018); see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 41 (AM. L.
INST. 2012).
88 Regents, 413 P.3d at 664; see Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, 45 P.3d 1171, 1182–
83 (Cal. 2002).
89 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 40
cmt. h (AM. L. INST. 2012).
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The Restatement (Third) of Torts has recognized several
special relationships that may support the imposition of a duty.90
Under section 40, special relationships giving rise to a duty can
include (1) common carriers with passengers, (2) innkeepers with
guests, (3) business with those who are lawfully on the premises,
(4) employers with employees under certain circumstances,
(5) schools with students, (5) landlords with tenants, and
(6) custodians with those in its custody under certain conditions.91
Section 41 covers special relationships resulting in the imposition
of a duty to a third person.92 Special relationships, whether
explicitly stated in the Restatement (Third) of Torts or otherwise,
include common features.93 These common features include
dependency, defined boundaries, and benefit to the party charged
with care.94
1. Dependency
Special relationships generally include some aspect of
dependency.95 Indeed, “the law appears to be heading toward a
recognition of the duty to aid or protect in any relation of
dependence or of mutual dependence.”96 A relationship of
dependency refers to one party relying to some degree on the
other party for protection.97 On the other side of dependency in a
special relationship is control.98 When one party is dependent on
the other party, that other party has control over the
mechanisms of protection.99
A classic dependency situation resulting in a special
relationship exists between a jailer and a prisoner.100 A special
relationship has also been recognized between a common carrier
and its passengers as passengers are confined in the moving

90 Regents, 413 P.3d 656, 664; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 40, 41 (AM. L. INST. 2012).
91 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 40
(AM. L. INST. 2012).
92 Id. § 41 (including “(1) a parent with dependent children, (2) a custodian with
those in its custody, (3) an employer with employees when the employment facilitates the
employee's causing harm to third parties, and (4) a mental-health professional with
patients.”).
93 Regents, 413 P.3d at 664.
94 Id. at 664–65.
95 Id. at 664; see Baldwin v. Zoradi, 176 Cal. Rptr. 809, 814 (Cal Ct. App. 1981),
overruled on other grounds by Regents, 413 P.3d 656 (Cal. 2018).
96 Regents, 413 P.3d at 664–65 (observing this shift began over fifty years ago); Mann
v. State, 139 Cal. Rptr. 82, 86 (Ct. App. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A
cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1965).
97 Regents, 413 P.3d at 664.
98 Id. at 665.
99 Id.; Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 708, 723 (Ct. App. 2019).
100 Giraldo v. Cal. Dept. of Corr. & Rehab., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 371, 386 (Ct. App. 2008).
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vehicle and the driver has exclusive control over the entrances
and exits of the vehicle.101 The Supreme Court of California has
recognized dependency and control relationships between
business proprietors and their tenants or patrons, between
innkeepers and their guests, and between mental health
professionals and their patients.102 Significantly, the cases point
out a typical setting for a special relationship is where “the
plaintiff is particularly vulnerable and dependent upon the
defendant who, correspondingly, has some control over the
plaintiff’s welfare.”103
2. Defined Boundaries
Special relationships are also defined by specific boundaries
creating a duty of care “owed to a limited community, not the
public at large.”104 A special relationship may impose a duty owed
to a specific person, or a specific group of persons.105 The scope of
the duty owed applies to dangers that are within the confines of
the relationship.106 It does not extend to risks or dangers that are
not within the confines of the relationship.107 As such, the scope
of the duty is generally confined by geography and time.108
Imposing any sort of affirmative duty on a party necessarily
imposes a burden.109 Nevertheless, the clearly defined boundaries
of the special relationship lower the burden and incursion on the
party’s autonomy, thus justifying the imposition of an affirmative
duty.110

101 Lopez v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 710 P.2d 907, 912 (Cal. 1985) (reasoning
passengers have no say or control over who can enter the vehicle and are entirely
dependent upon the driver to provide help or escape when danger occurs).
102 Giraldo, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 382; Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, 113 P.3d 1159, 1165
(Cal. 2005).
103 Regents, 413 P.3d at 665 (quoting Giraldo, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 382); Brown, 253
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 723.
104 Regents, 413 P.3d at 665.
105 See id. at 667 (finding a special relationship “with students while they are
engaged in activities that are part of the school's curriculum or closely related to its
delivery of educational services.”); Buford v. State, 164 Cal. Rptr. 264, 272 (Ct. App. 1980)
(concluding a special relationship existed between the state and prisoner such that the
state owed a duty to warn a foreseeable victim of the prisoner’s release), overruled on
other grounds by Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist., 444 P.3d 688 (Cal. 2019).
106 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §40
cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2012).
107 Id. §40 cmt. f.
108 Id.
109 See Regents, 413 P.3d at 673 (recognizing measures to protect or warn may be
burdensome, expensive, and impractical to implement); Kesner v. Superior Ct., 384 P.3d
283, 296 (Cal. 2016) (highlighting the correct burden is cost to defendants in upholding
the duty, not the cost to defendants of violating the duty).
110 Regents, 413 P.3d 656, 665; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL
AND EMOTIONAL HARM §40 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2012).
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Courts in California have consistently found schools are in a
special relationship with students; even a college is in a special
relationship with its students but only in the confines of school
sponsored activities that the college has some control over.111
However, the courts are mindful that it is unreasonable in some
situations for students to rely on their school for protection,
particularly with regard to college students partaking in off
campus festivities.112 The differing results reached in these
situations demonstrates the court’s detailed attention to the
boundaries of the particular special relationship.
3. Benefit to the Party Charged with Care
Special relationships are usually characterized by the party
charged with care experiencing a benefit or an advantage
because of the relationship.113 Even where both parties in the
relationship experience a benefit, a special relationship can still
be found.114 A special relationship has been imposed between a
college and its student-athletes in part because of the importance
and benefits athletic competitions bring to the school.115 In
addition, retail stores and hotels may be deemed in a special
relationship with their customers and guests, pointing to the
advantage and even necessity of the customers and guests to the
business’s successful operation.116 Many court opinions do not
explicitly address this factor in their special relationship
analyses.117 However, the courts implicitly endorse the receipt of
the benefit by the party charged with a duty as a justification for
111 See, e.g., Regents, 413 P.3d at 674 (holding the college owed a duty of reasonable
care to protect students during curricular activities like attending class); Avila v. Citrus
Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 392–93 (Cal. 2006) (finding the college owed a duty of
reasonable care during school-supervised athletic events); Patterson v. Sacramento City
Unified Sch. Dist., 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 337, 344 (Ct. App. 2007) (concluding the school owed a
duty of reasonable care during a school sponsored community service project).
112 See Univ. of S. Cal. v. Superior Ct., 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 629 (Ct. App. 2018);
Barenborg v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity, 244 Cal. Rptr. 3d 680, 691 (Ct. App. 2019).
113 Regents, 413 P.3d at 665; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL
AND EMOTIONAL HARM §40 cmt. h (AM. L. INST. 2012).
114 Regents, 413 P.3d at 665; Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 708, 723
(Ct. App. 2019).
115 See Avila, 131 P.3d at 392; James J. Hefferan, Jr., Taking One for the Team:
Davidson v. University of North Carolina and the Duty of Care Owed by Universities to
Their Student-Athletes, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 589, 589–90, 605–06 (2002) (including
enhanced recruitment of athletes, enhanced recruitment of other students, increased
donations from alumni, and revenue).
116 See Regents, 413 P.3d at 665; Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 708,
723 (Ct. App. 2019); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW, TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 40 cmt. j (AM. L. INST. 2012).
117 See e.g., Conti v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc., 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d
26, 41 (Ct. App. 2015) (assuming a religious institution receives a huge benefit from
having its members perform field service and go out in to the world to spread its
doctrines, even though the court never expressly states this).
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the imposition of the burden of the affirmative duty on that
party.118
III. DIFFERENCES IN APPLICATION OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
FACTORS AND ROWLAND POLICY FACTORS
In the context of childhood sexual abuse cases, a plaintiff
who is sexually abused as a minor child by a third party often
will argue that while the defendant institution did not act
affirmatively to cause the harm, the rule of nonliability should
still be set aside due to the nature of the specific
circumstances.119 Specifically, the plaintiff will allege the specific
circumstances created a special relationship, resulting in the
defendant institution owing the minor child plaintiff a duty of
care.120 In response, the defendant institution will argue no
special relationship existed between the institution and the
minor child or between the institution and the third-party
abuser.121 Thus, the defendant institution maintains it owed no
duty to plaintiff to control the conduct of a third-party sexual
abuser, nor did it owe the plaintiff a duty to warn of the danger
posed by the third-party sexual abuser.122
In these cases, the relevant inquiry is not simply whether
there exists some special relationship; the inquiry also
comprehends deliberation of the same policy considerations
discussed in Rowland.123 However, courts have not always been
consistent in their interpretation of the special relationship
factors and Rowland policy factors.124 In some cases, courts
analyzed the factors to determine the existence of a special
relationship, and then analyzed the relevant policy
considerations from Rowland to determine the existence of a
duty.125 In some cases, when the courts found a special
relationship did not exist, they denied the existence of a duty
before even considering the Rowland factors.126 Yet in another

See id. at 43.
See, e.g., Brown, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 720.
See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., id. at 721.
See, e.g., id. 720–21.
See Hansra v. Superior Ct. of Yuba Cnty., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216, 226 (Ct. App. 1992);
Adams v. City of Fremont, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 196, 222 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[R]esolution of the
question whether a special relationship gives rise to a duty of protection requires
consideration of the same Rowland factors underlying any duty of care analysis.”).
124 See Brown, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 723; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Ct. of
L.A. Cnty., 413 P.3d 656, 669–70 (Cal. 2018); Barenborg v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon
Fraternity, 244 Cal. Rptr. 3d 680, 686–87 (Ct. App. 2019); Juarez v. Boy Scouts of Am.,
Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 36 (Ct. App. 2000).
125 See Brown, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 723; Regents, 413 P.3d at 669–70.
126 See Brown, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 733; Barenborg, 244 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 686–87.
118
119
120
121
122
123
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case, the court found the Rowland factors were sufficient to
impose a duty, though had it analyzed the special relationship
factors, its decision would not have changed.127 Clearly, the
courts have been inconsistent and unpredictable in their
application of these tests to determine the existence of an
affirmative duty to act. Moreover, “the interrelationship between
the traditional duty analysis and the ‘special relationship’
doctrine has never been clearly defined.”128
Notwithstanding this confusion, the recent trends indicate
plaintiffs alleging a defendant institution had a duty to protect
them must establish (1) that the special relationship exception to
the general no duty to protect rule applies and (2) the balancing
of the Rowland factors support the imposition of the duty.129 The
existence of the special relationship itself does not create the
duty, rather the special relationship adds to the factors favoring
imposition of a duty of care in particular circumstances, thereby
outweighing the countervailing factors.130 This incorporation of
the Rowland policy factors into the question of duty resulting
from a special relationship follows the trend of an overwhelming
majority of American jurisdictions, and in particular, aligns with
the key Supreme Court of California decisions on point.131
A. Key Supreme Court of California Decisions Demonstrating
Varying Applications of the Two Tests
In its pending issues summary describing the question posed
in Brown, the summary referenced several significant cases that
have played a role in the development of the law.132 While the list
in the summary is not exhaustive and many cases have helped
shape the current state of negligence law, this list provides a
comprehensive starting point in order to accurately understand
and predict the direction of negligence law in California.

See Juarez, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 36.
Adams, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 210.
See id. at 209; cf. Conti v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y, Inc., 186 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 26, 38 (Ct. App. 2015) (stating a number of cases find the absence of a special
relationship dispositive and balancing the Rowland factors is not necessary).
130 See Hansra v. Superior Ct. of Yuba Cnty., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216, 226 (Ct. App. 1992)
(explaining that one factor weighing against the imposition of a duty is that the harm was
caused by a third person, thus the connection between the plaintiff’s injury and the
defendant’s conduct is attenuated—but the existence of a special relationship between the
defendant and the plaintiff, or the defendant and the third party that caused the injury,
counterbalances the weight of this factor.)
131 See Adams, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 223; Peter F. Lake, Common Law Duty in
Negligence Law: The Recent Consolidation of a Consensus on the Expansion of the
Analysis of Duty and the New Conservative Liability Limiting Use of Policy
Considerations, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1503, 1505 (1997).
132 See Pending Issues Summary, supra note 46.
127
128
129
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1. Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988)
In Nally, Kenneth Nally (“Nally”), a twenty-four year old
man committed suicide and his parents sued Grace Community
Church of the Valley (“Church”) for the wrongful death of their
son.133 The Church offered a pastoral counseling service that had
approximately thirty non-therapist counselors who served a
congregation of approximately 10,000 people.134 Nally began
forming relationships with and receiving counseling from some of
the pastors and non-therapist counselors at the Church.135 In its
review, the Supreme Court of California agreed with the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment.136 The court found that no
evidence presented, nor principles of tort law supported the
imposition of a duty to refer in this case.137
Here, the court analyzed both the special relationship and
Rowland factors to make its determination. The court first
sought to determine if a duty existed under the special
relationship exception.138 The court relied on the non-therapist
counselor’s lack of control over Nally to negate the finding of a
special relationship resulting in a duty.139 Next, the court
examined the Rowland factors to determine if a duty may
nonetheless be imposed.140 While the court admitted it is
foreseeable a suicidal individual who is not referred to a
professional may commit suicide, the imposition of a duty to refer
could “stifle all gratuitous or religious counseling.”141 As to the
closeness of the connection between the Church’s conduct and
Nally’s suicide, the court found the connection was extremely
tenuous.142 Further, the imposition of a duty on non-therapist
counselors could have a huge deterrent effect on encouraging
private assistance efforts, which the legislature has sought to
encourage.143 In recognition of the lack of factors indicating the
existence of a special relationship, the foreseeability and policy
considerations involved, and the difficulty in precisely

See Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church, 763 P.2d 948, 949 (Cal. 1988).
Id. at 950.
See id.
See id. at 955.
See id.
See id. at 956.
139 See id. at 958.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 959.
142 See id. at 958–59 (finding Nally was examined by five physicians and a
psychiatrist during the weeks before his suicide and Nally refused psychiatric
commitment).
143 See id. at 959.
133
134
135
136
137
138
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determining whom the duty should apply to, the court found the
Church did not have a duty to prevent Nally’s suicide.144
2. Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America (2000)
In Juarez, the plaintiff sued the Boys Scouts of America
(“Boy Scouts”) asserting the Boy Scouts breached their duty of
care to take reasonable protective measures to protect the
plaintiff from the risk of sexual abuse by adult volunteers
involved in the program.145 In the 1980s, the Boy Scouts
identified child sexual abuse as socially unacceptable and
committed many of its resources to protect children from it.146
The Boy Scouts developed a program to educate all participants
in the program in detection and prevention of sexual
molestation.147 The Boy Scouts had developed a comprehensive
video as an educational tool, however it was never shown to
plaintiff’s troop.148 Despite the Boy Scout’s purported efforts at
prevention, the plaintiff was repeatedly sexually abused by his
scoutmaster during officially sanctioned scouting events.149
The court held that the Boy Scouts owed a legal duty to the
plaintiff to take reasonable measures to protect him from sexual
abuse by one of the program’s volunteers.150 Here, the court
solely analyzed the Rowland foreseeability and policy factors.151
The court noted that foreseeability is a flexible concept:
In cases where the burden of preventing future harm is great, a high
degree of foreseeability may be required. On the other hand, in cases
where there are strong policy reasons for preventing the harm, or the
harm can be prevented by simple means, a lesser degree of
foreseeability may be required.152

Since the Boy Scouts admitted that: (1) there was a possibility
that pedophiles would be drawn to their programs (as the
programs provided access to young boys), and (2) that they
received, on average, more than one report of sexual abuse per
week, it was “likely enough in the setting of modern life that a
reasonably thoughtful [person] would take account of it in guiding
practical conduct.”153 The court took it a step further, concluding

Id. at 960.
See Juarez v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 17 (Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 26.
Id.
148 Id. at 27.
149 Id. at 17.
150 See id.
151 See id. at 29–30.
152 Id. at 30. (quoting Issacs v. Huntington Mem’l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 658 (Cal.
1985)) (citations omitted).
153 Id.
144
145
146
147
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that even sexual abuse by a person with “no documented history of
such proclivities” was reasonably foreseeable to the Boy Scouts.154
The court also examined the closeness of the connection
between the suffered injury and the defendant’s conduct and
found that, in touting the effectiveness of its youth program, the
Boy Scouts admitted education was an effective tool to prevent
sexual abuse.155 By not providing these educational materials to
plaintiff’s troop, the court found that there was a sufficient
causal link between the Boy Scouts negligent acts and the harm
suffered by the plaintiff.156 As to policy considerations, the court
found that society and the state overwhelmingly recognize an
interest in protecting the welfare of children.157 Moreover, the
burden of imposing a duty on the Boy Scouts was minimal.158 The
Boy Scouts already had an effective system in place to ensure its
program and educational materials were provided to the
volunteers,
parents,
and
children
in its
programs,
notwithstanding the fact that it failed to provide these materials
to plaintiff’s troop.159 Significantly, the court pointed to the Boy
Scout’s widespread organization, which is chartered under an act
of Congress, and its purpose of developing a specific set of values
in young boys; because of this, it was imperative that the
organization understand the risks of sexual abuse, and work to
combat it.160 The court ultimately found that the benefits to the
community in recognizing a duty would far outweigh any
minimal burden imposed on the Boy Scouts.161
Interestingly, the court was reluctant to also conduct a
special relationship analysis, as it found that balancing the
Rowland factors was sufficient to impose a duty.162 Despite its
reluctance, the court noted it would have found that a special
relationship existed between the Boy Scouts and the plaintiff,
thereby giving rise to a duty to protect for a number of reasons:
The mission of youth organizations to educate children, the naivete of
children, and the insidious tactics employed by child molesters dictate
that the law recognize a special relationship between youth
organizations and the members such that the youth organizations are

154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162

Id. at 31.
See id. at 32.
See id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 36.
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required to exercise reasonable care to protect their members from the
foreseeable conduct of third persons.163

3. Conti v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York,
Inc. (2015)
The court in Conti had to determine whether a religious
institution owed a duty to one of its members who had been
sexually abused by another member.164 The plaintiff was
molested by another member of the congregation, Johnathan
Kendrick (“Kendrick”), from the time she was nine years old until
she was around ten or eleven years old.165 Kendrick had been
accused of inappropriately touching his stepdaughter, also a
member of the congregation, just four months earlier.166 Despite
this allegation, Kendrick was allowed to continue participating in
field service.167 Much of the sexual abuse of the plaintiff occurred
while Kendrick and plaintiff were supposed to be performing
field service, thus affording Kendrick unsupervised access to the
minor plaintiff.168 The plaintiff sued the religious institution
alleging that they had a duty to warn her and a duty to supervise
her participation in church activities.169 The court held that,
while defendant had no duty to warn, there was a duty to limit
and supervise a church sponsored activity like field service.170
In this instance, the court analyzed both the special
relationship and Rowland factors. The court found the religious
institution was in a special relationship with the plaintiff and
Kendrick when they were performing field service because the
religious institution exercised control over the service.171 The
institution’s policy is what allowed child molesters to continue
performing field service, and the institution controlled when, where,
and with whom field service would be conducted.172 Significantly,
the court noted that the abuse happened during field service, a
church-sponsored activity, since the abuse occurred while they were
163 Id. (quoting Evans v. Ohio State Univ., 680 N.E.2d 161, 181 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)
(Lazarus, J., dissenting)).
164 Conti v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 30 (Ct.
App. 2015).
165 Id. at 30–31.
166 Id. at 31.
167 Id. at 30 (defining field service as “small groups, usually consisting of two or three
people, go[ing] door to door in neighborhoods to spread the church's spiritual teachings”).
Moreover, an official of the religious institution testified that policy “allowed a known
child molester to continue to perform field service, but not alone or with a child.” Id. at 31.
168 See id. at 34 (occurring at the member’s home where he drove the plaintiff during
field service).
169 See id. at 30.
170 See id.
171 Id. at 43.
172 Id.
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supposed to be performing field service.173 The court also found that
the Rowland factors supported the imposition of a duty because “it
is foreseeable that a child molester will reoffend, and the risk is
heightened when the molester is put in a position . . . to be alone
with a child[,] . . . imposition of this duty would [not] be unduly
burdensome . . . [and it] furthers the policy of preventing future
harm without affecting the confidentiality of penitential
communications.”174
4. Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Ass’n, Inc. (2017)
In United States Youth Soccer Ass’n, the plaintiff was
sexually abused by her former soccer coach when she was only
twelve years old.175 “In 1994, US Youth acknowledged that
pedophiles were drawn to its youth soccer program to gain access
to children, and its program presented an unacceptable risk of
harm to children unless appropriate preventative measures were
taken.”176 In recognition of this problem, US Youth developed a
KidSafe program designed to educate on the risks and exclude
persons who have been convicted of violence or crimes against
another person.177 US Youth possessed pamphlets and other
educational tools which could be used to educate youth, parents,
volunteers, and coaches about warning signs of abuse.178 Despite
this, no one involved in the affiliated league that the plaintiff
participated in was educated or trained in the KidSafe program,
no one was given any educational materials, and no discussions
or meetings were held regarding the KidSafe program.179 US
Youth also required affiliate leagues to screen criminal conviction
information from coaches, which could be accomplished through a
criminal background check by an independent third party or a
voluntary disclosure form.180 The coach who sexually abused the
plaintiff lied on his disclosure form, covering up a conviction for
battery against his spouse.181 No criminal background check for
verification was ever conducted on the coach.182
The plaintiff sued US Youth alleging an action for
negligence.183 Again, the court analyzed both the special
173 Id. (finding it irrelevant that the abuse occurred at the member’s home and not
out in the field).
174 Id. at 44.
175 Doe v. U.S. Youth Soccer Ass’n, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 3d 552, 559 (Ct. App. 2017).
176 Id. at 560.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 561–562.
181 Id. at 562.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 559.
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relationship factors and the Rowland factors separately. In
concluding that a special relationship existed between US Youth
and the plaintiff, the court recognized that “a greater degree of care
is owed to children because of their lack of capacity to appreciate
risks and avoid danger.”184 US Youth argued that parents were
present at games and practices, but the court still found that—in
this setting—US Youth was acting as a “quasi-parent” by assuming
responsibility for the safety of the children in its program when
their parents were not present.185 Further, the court rejected the
argument that the voluntary nature of participation precluded the
finding of a special relationship.186 Last, the court concluded that
US Youth exercised physical custody and control over the plaintiff
by establishing hiring standards for coaches, which in turn,
determined who had custody and supervision of the children in US
Youth’s programs.187
In examining the foreseeability of the conduct, the court took
a “sliding-scale balancing formula” approach where “imposition of
a high burden requires heightened foreseeability, but a minimal
burden may be imposed upon a showing of a lesser degree of
foreseeability.”188 While US Youth was not specifically aware of
the coach previously sexually abusing anyone or having a
propensity to do so, US Youth was aware of incidents of sexual
abuse by its coaches averaging between two and five instances
per year.189 More importantly, US Youth had developed its own
program, thereby acknowledging and recognizing the risk of
sexual abuse in its program.190 Additionally, the burden on US
Youth to conduct background checks was minimal as US Youth
had already demonstrated an administrative ability to ensure
compliance with performing background checks.191 The only
factor weighing in favor of US Youth was moral blame because,
although their procedure of using voluntary disclosure forms
proved ineffective, they made an attempt to identify potential

184 Id. at 564 (quoting Juarez v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 35 (Ct.
App. 2000).
185 See id. at 564.
186 Id. at 565 (reasoning that even though participation was voluntary, “parents
entrusted their children to defendants with the expectation that they would be kept
physically safe and protected from sexual predators while they participated in soccer
activities”).
187 Id. at 566.
188 Id. (quoting Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, 113 P.3d 1159, 1172 (Cal. 2005)) (noting
the requirement of heightened foreseeability can be met by showing “evidence of prior
similar criminal incidents or ‘other indications of a reasonably foreseeable risk of violent
criminal assaults’”).
189 Id. at 567.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 569.
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predators.192 “[B]alancing the degree of foreseeability of harm to
children in [US Youth’s] soccer programs against their minimal
burden, [the court] conclude[d] that [US Youth] had a duty to
require and conduct criminal background checks of [their]
employees and volunteers who had contact with children in their
programs.”193
5. Regents of University of California v. Superior Court
(2018)
In Regents, a student enrolled at the University of
California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”) began experiencing auditory
hallucinations.194 The student believed other students at UCLA
were criticizing him and mistreating him.195 Eventually the
student met with a psychologist at an outpatient treatment
center.196 The student’s mental health continued to decline, and
eventually the student stabbed a fellow classmate in the chest
and neck with a knife.197 The classmate sued the Regents of
University of California (“Regents”) alleging they had a special
relationship with her as an enrolled student and thus had a duty
to take reasonable protective measures to ensure her safety, to
warn her of reasonably foreseeable dangerous conduct on the
campus, and to control the reasonably foreseeable acts of other
students.198
The court first analyzed the ever-evolving college
environment under the special relationship exception.199
Importantly, the court recognized this as a situation not
involving alcohol-related injuries, and thus a broader view of
duties owed should be applied.200 In analyzing the relationship,
the court found students are very dependent on their college
Id. at 570.
Id. at 571. However, the court refused to impose a duty to educate about the risks
of sexual abuse because there are no uniform standards for effective education, and many
parents would consider education about risks of sexual abuse the responsibility of the
parent and not the sports organization. Id. at 572.
194 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 413 P.3d 656, 659 (Cal.
2018).
195 See id. at 660.
196 Id. at 661.
197 Id. at 662. The student who was stabbed, Katherine Rosen, was frequently
referred to by the student as one of his harassers, suggesting the student had identified a
foreseeable victim. See id. at 661–62.
198 Id. at 662.
199 See id. at 665.
200 Id. at 666. See Crow v. State, 271 Cal. Rptr. 349, 359–60 (Ct. App. 1990) (finding
no special relationship when a college student voluntarily participates and is injured at a
dorm keg party); Tanja H. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 278 Cal. Rptr. 918, 921 (Ct. App.
1991) (stressing the duty to prevent alcohol related crimes would require colleges to
“impose onerous conditions on the freedom and privacy of resident students,” contrary to
the modern view that adult students are generally responsible for their own welfare”).
192
193
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community.201 Colleges have the correlating control over the
ability and means used to protect students on its campus.202
Further, the special relationship is limited by a person’s
enrollment as a student at the school and by the person’s
involvement in a school sponsored activity.203 The court
concluded postsecondary schools do have a special relationship
with students, but only “while they are engaged in activities that
are part of the school’s curriculum or closely related to its
delivery of educational services.”204
Finding a special relationship, the court then turned to analysis
of the Rowland factors.205 Looking at foreseeability generally, the
court found even though they are rare, violent classroom attacks are
foreseeable occurrences.206 The court reasoned colleges were alert to
the possibility of violent third party attacks on students after the
focused national attention on the Virginia Tech shootings.207
Significantly, the court stated that case-specific foreseeability
questions, such as any prior acts of violence by the person who
committed the harm, “do not . . . inform our threshold determination
that a duty exists.”208 In addition, the fact that harm was caused by
an intervening act does not necessarily attenuate the defendant’s
negligent conduct.209 These factors relating to foreseeability all
support the imposition of a duty.210
Focusing on the policy implications, while moral blame has
been assigned in situations where the plaintiffs are “particularly
powerless or unsophisticated compared to the defendants,” college
students are not so powerless and unsophisticated.211 However, the
greater access to information regarding potential threats possessed
by the university creates a disparity in knowledge that favors the
imposition of a duty.212 Additionally, while imposition of a duty and
201 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 413 P.3d 656, 668 (Cal. 2018)
(providing students with structure, guidance, and a safe learning environment).
202 Id. (imposing rules and restriction, employing advisers, counselors, and campus
police, and monitoring student discipline). Case law from other jurisdictions also
recognizes that schools are in the best position to implement safety measures. Id.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 667.
205 See id. at 669–70.
206 See id. at 671. The court pointed out that in the wake of the Virginia Tech
shooting, “[c]olleges across the country, including the public universities of California,
created threat assessment protocols and multidisciplinary teams to identify and prevent
campus violence.” Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 672. “Although a criminal act is always shocking to some degree, it is not
completely unpredictable if a defendant is aware of the risk.” Id. See also Randi W. v.
Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582, 589 (Cal. 1997).
210 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 413 P.3d 656, 672 (Cal. 2018).
211 Id.
212 Id.
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thus liability may discourage colleges from offering certain mental
health and crisis services— and may incentivize colleges to simply
expel anyone who poses a threat—these concerns are negated
because colleges are restricted from arbitrary decisions on
admission and expulsions by certain laws and are regulated by
market forces.213 Last, the court examined the burden recognizing a
duty would impose on Regents and found Regents had already
developed strategies for handling potential threats.214 The court,
however, took its analysis of the burden one step further.
Recognizing that Regents, specifically UCLA, marketed itself as
“one of the safest campuses in the country” and that the University
of California system raised its registration fee, the court reasoned
the imposition of a burden would not be unmanageable since the
university had the available funds.215 Recognizing that a college is
in a special relationship with its students and that both the
foreseeability factors and policy factors support the imposition of a
duty, the court held “colleges have a duty to use reasonable care to
protect their students from foreseeable violence during curricular
activities.”216
B. Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2019)
In Brown, plaintiffs were minor athletes coached by Marc
Gitelman (“Gitelman”) and were participating in USAT’s youth
programs.217 USAT is one of forty-nine NGB’s that were certified
by USOC.218 USAT requires athletes to be USAT members,
requires athletes to train under USAT registered coaches, and
requires members comply with USAT rules and policies.219 The
plaintiffs and Gitelman were members of USAT and would
attend and participate at taekwondo competitions sanctioned and
sponsored by USAT and USOC.220 Since the 1980s, USOC has
had actual knowledge, via direct reports and complaints, that
numerous female athletes suffered sexual abuse at its
facilities.221 Additionally, a USOC employee was specifically
aware of at least one occurrence: the rape of a young female

213 See id. at 673 (restricting a college's decision to expel a student under the
Americans with Disabilities Act and regulating services offered by colleges through
competitive market forces favoring schools that adopt sophisticated violence prevention
practices).
214 See id. (countering the argument that implementation of a duty would be
expensive and impractical).
215 See id.
216 Id. at 674.
217 Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 708, 715–17 (Ct. App. 2019).
218 Id. at 717.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
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taekwondo athlete at a USOC training center.222 Moreover, by
the early 2000s, the prevalence of allegations of sexual
misconduct in institutions was a widely known risk.223 Despite
general recognition of this risk and reports by athletes of
inappropriate sexual behavior, USAT and USOC did little to
protect athletes from the abuse.224
Gitelman sexually abused and molested the plaintiffs while
attending USOC and USAT sanctioned events.225 He also
sexually abused plaintiffs at USOC’s Olympic training center. 226
Gitelman did not hide his relationships and inappropriate
behavior with the plaintiffs, and the relationships were common
knowledge throughout the taekwondo community.227 Finally, in
2013, Gitelman’s abuse allegations were brought before the
USAT ethics committee, who recommended his termination.228
Despite this recommendation, USAT did not fire Gitelman.229
USOC’s director of ethics and safe sport and USAT’s chief
executive officer and USAT’s ethics committee chair, were aware
of the hearing and recommended termination, but allowed
Gitelman to continue as a member in good standing at USAT and
continue to attend USAT and USOC sanctioned events.230
Eventually, Gitelman was convicted of felonies for his sexual
misconduct with the plaintiffs.231 The plaintiffs sued USAT and
USOC, alleging USAT and USOC owed a duty to protect
plaintiffs from Gitelman’s sexual abuse.232 The trial court
dismissed plaintiff’s claims, and the plaintiff’s appealed. 233
Regarding the USAT, the appellate court found USAT had a
special relationship with Gitelman.234 USAT required Gitelman
to be a USAT member and comply with USAT policies and
procedures. Eventually, USAT terminated Gitelman for his
noncompliance.235 Therefore, USAT was “in the best position to
protect against the risk of harm and meaningfully reduce the risk
of harm that actually occurred.”236 The court distinguished the
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 718.
Id.
Id. at 719.
Id.
See id.
Id.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 715.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 725.
235 Id. (reasoning “USAT can, and did, enforce its policies and procedures by
temporarily suspending Gitelman pending the ethics committee hearing”).
236 Id.
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
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facts from Barenborg v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity, where
the fraternity could only implement control, after the fact.237 The
Rowland factors also supported the imposition of a duty against
USAT. 238 Based on the widespread allegations across NGB’s and
within USAT, it was foreseeable a coach could sexually abuse a
minor athlete attending a competition.239 Actual knowledge of
Gitelman’s dangerous propensities was not required to determine
a duty.240 In addition, USAT’s failure to take preventative steps
to prevent sexual assault was closely connected to plaintiff’s
injuries.241 This same failure to take preventative measures
constituted moral blame on USAT.242 Furthermore, the policy of
preventing future harm weighed in favor of imposing a duty
because society has a common goal of safeguarding children.243
Last, the court concluded the burden from imposing a duty would
not be substantial because USAT had already enacted a code of
ethics, had disciplinary procedures, and could ban any sexually
abusive person from coaching.244
Regarding USOC, the court found USOC was not in a special
relationship with either the plaintiffs or Gitelman.245 The court
found USOC could regulate USAT’s conduct, but not
Gitelman’s.246 They also found USOC was not in the best position
to protect plaintiffs from their coach’s sexual abuse.247 USOC’s
control over Gitelman was too remote, meaning USOC could not
control Gitelman directly, nor was USOC able to prevent him
from coaching at competitions.248 Since the court found USOC
had no special relationship with either Gitelman or the plaintiffs,
the court did not analyze the Rowland factors.249 The plaintiffs
appealed to the Supreme Court of California based on the finding
that USOC had no special relationship with the plaintiffs and
therefore did not owe a duty of care.

237 See id. at 725–26; Barenborg v. Sigma Phi Epsilon Fraternity, 244 Cal. Rptr. 3d
680, 688 (Ct. App. 2019).
238 Brown, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 726.
239 Id. at 728.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 729.
242 Id. at 730.
243 Id.
244 See id. at 731.
245 See id.
246 See id. at 732.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 733. The courts in Barenborg and University of Southern California also
refused to perform the analysis of the Rowland factors once they concluded the institution
was not in a special relationship with the plaintiff or the third-party perpetrator. See
Barenborg v. Sigma Phi Epsilon Fraternity, 244 Cal. Rptr. 3d 680, 687 (Ct. App. 2019);
Univ. of S. Cal. v. Superior Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 629 (Ct. App. 2018).
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IV. CRITIQUE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA’S DECISION
IN BROWN
In its decision, the Supreme Court of California determined
whether to recognize a duty to protect minor children in
institutions is a two-step inquiry.250 First, the court must
determine if a special relationship existed.251 Second, and only if
a special relationship existed, the court must analyze the policy
factors established in Rowland to determine if the duty should be
limited.252
In its discussion, the court articulates that “[t]he multifactor
test set forth in Rowland was not designed as a freestanding
means of establishing a duty, but instead as a means for deciding
whether to limit a duty derived from other sources.”253 Thus, the
Rowland factors alone cannot create the duty. The court cites
much precedent for its inability and unwillingness to use the
Rowland factors as a stand alone test for creation of a new duty,
while seemingly discounting others.254 But the court still sees a
role for the Rowland factors.255 It acknowledged the overlap
between the special relationship factors and the Rowland factors,
but distinguished them based on how the factors operate.256 The
special relationship factors apply to the particular facts of that
case, whereas the Rowland factors consider the policy of
imposing a duty at a relatively broad level.257
But this interpretation is too simple. Both the particular
facts of the case and the broad policy considerations should play
a role in deciding to impose a duty. It is clear that sexual abuse
within institutions that care for children is happening far too
often with very few consequences on the institutions. Shouldn’t
this foreseeability (one of the Rowland factors) play a role in
deciding to impose a duty, even when the level of dependence or
control appear more attenuated? This highlights the importance
of using both the special relationship and Rowland factors,
especially when the outcome of this determination affects the
willingness of an institution to protect the minor children in its
care. When the court is more likely to impose a duty, the
institutions will conform their behavior in anticipation of that

250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257

Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 11 Cal. 5th 204,209 (2021).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 217.
See id. at 217–19 (minimizing the weight and discussions in Nally and Adams).
Id. at 221.
Id.
Id.
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duty, taking greater steps to supervise, monitor, and protect the
children within their care.
As is discussed more fully infra, the special relationship
factors and Rowland factors should be analyzed together to fully
contemplate both the specific factual circumstances and the
broad level considerations of childhood sexual abuse within
institutions, before deciding whether or not a duty should be
imposed.
V. WHEN THE COURT SHOULD FIND A DUTY AND THE POTENTIAL
IMPACTS OF A SIMPLIFIED TEST FOR IMPOSITION OF A DUTY
A. Proposed Test Based on California’s Case Law
As can be seen in the cases previously described, the analysis
for a special relationship’s existence and the foreseeability and
policy analyses of the Rowland factors are intertwined. Both
analyses seek to answer the same question: when do the
circumstances justify imposing a duty? While the tests
themselves appear to analyze different factors,258 I propose they
do no such thing. In fact, the analyses in all of the cases
described above rely on the same policy considerations and
factual situations to reach a conclusion. More importantly,
California courts have already recognized how the existence of a
special relationship plays into the Rowland analysis. The
existence of the special relationship itself does not create the
duty, but tips the scales of the factor test in favor of imposing a
duty.259 In its most basic sense, the court stated that the
existence of a special relationship is another factor to weigh in
determining if a duty should exist.
As such, the appropriate test to determine when an
institution owes a duty to protect a child from sexual abuse by a

258 The special relationship analysis looks at dependence, boundaries, and benefit on
the party charged with a duty. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Ct. of L.A. Cnty.,
413 P.3d 656, 664 (Cal. 2018). The Rowland analysis considers “the foreseeability of harm
to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of
the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame
attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of
the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to
exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence
of insurance for the risk involved.” See Rowland, Jr. v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal.
1968).
259 See Hansra v. Superior Ct. of Yuba Cnty., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216, 226 (Ct. App. 1992)
(arguing that one factor weighing against the imposition of a duty is that the harm was
caused by a third person, thus the connection between the plaintiff’s injury and the
defendant’s conduct is attenuated—but the existence of a special relationship between the
defendant and the plaintiff, or the defendant and the third party that caused the injury,
counterbalances the weight of this factor).
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third party should be a combination of the special relationship
factors and Rowland factors. Based on the case law in California,
I propose the courts should analyze only the factors of (1) the
dependence of the child on the institution for protection, (2) the
control the institution has over the means of protection, (3) and
the burden on the institution and consequences to the community
of imposing a duty, with the rest of the factors automatically
weighing in favor of imposing a duty. This test encompasses the
remaining factors originally detailed in the special relationship
analysis and the Rowland factors analysis, and a court can
automatically deem that the remaining factors weigh in favor of
the imposition of a duty. In its most basic sense, this test would
act as a presumption of a duty that can be rebutted by the
institution. This proposed test simplifies the number of factors
the court must consider in making a determination to impose a
duty, while also ensuring the court considers all relevant details
and facts.
1. Factors Automatically Weighing in Favor of Imposing a
Duty, Thereby Creating a Strong Presumption that a Duty
Exists
Due to the policy considerations surrounding childhood
sexual abuse, a court can automatically deem certain factors to
weigh in favor of imposing a duty, because those factors will only
ever point to one result.
First, and most important to the determination of the
existence of a duty, is foreseeability.260 For the analysis on
whether or not to impose a duty, acts of sexual abuse perpetrated
on a child within institutions who design programs for children
can be deemed generally foreseeable. The Supreme Court of
California has stated that case-specific foreseeability questions,
such as any prior acts of violence by the person who committed
the harm, “do not . . . inform our threshold determination that a
duty exists.”261 Thus a court need not consider actual knowledge
on the part of an institution to impose a duty, but instead
whether an act of sexual abuse was generally foreseeable.262 The
court in Juarez found foreseeability could be met if the abuse was
“likely enough in the setting of modern life that a reasonably
thoughtful person would take account of it in guiding practical

260 See Regents, 413 P.3d at 670–71 (quoting Kesner v. Superior Ct. of Alameda Cnty.,
384 P.3d 283, 291 (Cal. 2016)); Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342
(Cal. 1976).
261 Regents, 413 P.3d at 671.
262 Actual knowledge, however, may be informative for the analysis of breach of a duty.
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conduct.”263 The risk of sexual abuse to a child in an institution’s
care is foreseeable due to the number of cases brought to the
institutions attention through both the media and their own
inter-disciplinary processes. Any reasonably thoughtful person in
society would take account of that risk in guiding practical
conduct. Thus, the general foreseeability of incidents of sexual
abuse in institutions weighs heavily in favor of imposing a duty.
Additionally, the certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury
will always weigh in favor of the imposition of a duty. There is no
rational argument that children do not suffer harm when they
are sexually abused at a young age. Moreover, as previously
discussed, the child’s harm is drastic and can result in damaging
lifelong effects.264
Next, the policy of preventing future harm can also be
deemed as favoring the imposition of a duty. The court has held
protecting children from sexual abuse, in order to safeguard the
physical and psychological well-being of its minor children, is a
compelling state interest.265 Moreover, the legislature through its
recent enactments, has so clearly announced there is a huge
importance and need to safeguard children against acts of sexual
abuse.266 “Public policy against the victimization of children is
most evident in our criminal laws, which exact a heavy toll from
those who endanger our most precious asset. So, too, it must be
in our civil law.”267 Last, society as a whole has indicated its
awareness and desire to combat instances of sexual abuse and
sexual violence, especially with regard to children.268 Thus, this
factor will always weigh in favor of imposing a duty.
Another factor that weighs in favor of imposing a duty is the
availability and cost of insurance. While insurance costs may at
first seem prohibitive, especially to poorly funded child-centered
institutions, the availability of insurance for incidents of sexual
abuse is more prevalent than ever, and institutions have many
options when it comes to deciding what insurance to use.269
Juarez v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 30 (Ct. App. 2000).
See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text.
See Burt v. County of Orange, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373, 382 (Ct. App. 2004).
See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text.
Juarez, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Statistics: Age, ME TOO, http://metoomvmt.org/learn-more/statistics/
[http://perma.cc/Y5E5-BMWN] (last visited Oct. 7, 2020) (detailing statistics of sexual
abuse by age from a multitude of studies); Safety Support for Parents, RAINN,
http://www.rainn.org/safety-parents [http://perma.cc/RB7H-HHCF] (last visited Oct. 7,
2020) (providing information to parents for discussing sexual abuse with children).
269 See Marshall Gilinsky, Standard Insurance Policy Coverage for Sexual Abuse,
Harassment, and Assault Claims, RISK MANAGEMENT (Sept. 12, 2019),
http://www.rmmagazine.com/2019/09/12/standard-insurance-policy-coverage-for-sexualabuse-harassment-and-assault-claims/ [http://perma.cc/9K63-G3YM].
263
264
265
266
267
268
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Moreover, compared to the costs and time spent defending claims
of sexual abuse, the cost of insurance coverage for claims of
sexual abuse is relatively low.270 Due to the low cost of insurance
compared to the alternative of litigation, and the availability and
prevalence of insurance, the Rowland factor will always weigh in
favor of imposing a duty in today’s society.
Finally, the factor of moral blame will always weigh in favor
of imposing a duty. Moral blame usually refers to “evidence that
a defendant knew or reasonably should have known there was
any danger or potential danger associated with that defendant’s
act or failure to act.”271 Moral blame has been assigned in
situations where the plaintiffs are “particularly powerless or
unsophisticated compared to the defendants.”272 In this context,
the minors in childcare institutions will constantly be powerless
or unsophisticated compared to the defendants. Moreover, the
institution has more knowledge regarding the danger posed to
the minor plaintiff.273 Furthermore, even in cases in which the
court found moral blame to be placed on the institution, a duty
was still imposed on the institution.274 Thus the existence of
moral blame on the institution’s behavior weigh in favor of
imposing a duty, while the absence of moral blame does not
weigh against imposing a duty.
2. Encompassed Factors in the Test Which Further Supports
Use of a Simplified Test
In considering the Rowland factor of effects of the burden to
the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a
duty, the boundaries of the special relationship are also
necessarily considered. The burden on the institution will be too
large if the scope of the duty cannot be limited in a meaningful
way, and the scope of the duty is determined by the boundaries of
the special relationship. These concepts are clearly interrelated
and would require an analysis of the same underlying facts to
make a determination. Additionally, the facts considered for
whether the person charged with a duty benefits from the special

270 See
Abuse
and
Molestation
Insurance
Coverage,
WEST
BEND,
http://cultureofsafety.thesilverlining.com/childcare/insurance/abuse-and-molestationcoverage/ [http://perma.cc/2PSD-J5X4] (last visited June 19, 2020) (acknowledging the
annual cost for a one million dollar abuse policy costs between five to ten dollars per
child).
271 Butcher v. Gay, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 771, 780 (Ct. App. 1994).
272 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 413 P.3d 656, 672 (Cal.
2018) (quoting Kesner v. Superior Ct., 384 P.3d 283, 295 (Cal. 2016)).
273 See id.
274 See Doe v. U.S. Youth Soccer Ass’n, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 3d 552, 570–71 (Ct. App.
2017); Juarez v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 33 (Ct. App. 2000).
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relationship also plays into the Rowland burden analysis. If the
person charged with a duty is receiving significant benefits as a
result of the relationship, it may outweigh any burden placed on
them by the imposition of that duty. Therefore, analysis of the
burden to the defendant and consequences to the community will
necessarily encompass consideration of the boundaries of the
special relationship and any benefits to the party charged with
the duty.
Further, the analysis of the dependence of the child on the
institution and the control the institution has over the means of
the protection necessarily encompasses the Rowland factor of
closeness in the connection between the defendant’s conduct and
the injury suffered. An institution’s failure to protect a child will
be most clear when the child was dependent on the institution for
protection, and the institution had a clear means of protection.
Thus, there is a direct relationship between the dependence and
control factors and the closeness of the connection factor. As the
child’s dependence on the institution for protection and the
institution’s control over the means of protection increases, the
closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and
the injury suffered also increases. Conversely, as dependence and
control decrease, so does the closeness of connection. Accordingly,
the consideration of dependence and control will encompass the
Rowland factor closeness of connection between the defendant’s
conduct and injury suffered.
3. Remaining Factors that Must be Weighed to Determine if
the Institution has Overcome the Presumption that a Duty
Exists
After identifying the encompassed factors and those factors
that will always weigh in favor of imposing a duty, the court is
left to test and weigh the factors of (1) the dependence of the
child on the institution for protection, (2) the control the
institution has over the means of protection, (3) and the burden
on the institution and consequences to the community of
imposing a duty.
When analyzing the factor of the dependence of the child on
the institution for protection, the court should consider the
degree of reliance of the minor children on the institution for
protection, the vulnerability and sophistication of the children in
the program, the purpose of the institution, and whether the
institution presents itself as safe for children involved in its
programs. In United States Youth Soccer Ass’n, Inc., this factor
played a key role in the imposition of a duty on the institution. In
that case, the court found that the defendant institution assumed
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a “quasi-parent” responsibility for the safety of the players when
the parents were not present.275 As children greatly depend on
their parents for safety, the children involved in the institution’s
activities also greatly depend on the institution for safety. The
court extended this concept even further in Regents, where it
found college students are sufficiently dependent on their college
communities to support an imposition of a duty.276
In the closed environment of a school campus where students pay
tuition and other fees in exchange for using the facilities, where they
spend a significant portion of their time and may in fact live, they can
reasonably expect that the premises will be free from physical defects
and that school authorities will also exercise reasonable care to keep
the campus free from conditions which increase the risk of crime.277

To analyze the factor of control that an institution has over
the means of protection, the court should consider the
institution’s ability to control both directly and indirectly the
child’s or third party’s behavior, the connection between the
institutions control and the injury suffered, and the disparity in
knowledge between the child and the institution regarding the
risks involved. This factor of control was vital to the decision in
Nally not to impose a duty. There, the court relied heavily on the
fact that non-therapist counselors from the church had no control
over the environment of the injured person.278 Conversely, in
Conti, the court found the institution exercised considerable
control over the means of protection since the institution
determined who remained eligible to perform field service,
determined when, where, and with whom field service would be
conducted, and determined the perpetrator’s access to children
while performing field service.279 While the control in Conti
appeared to be direct control over the means of protection, the
court has also recognized methods of indirect control. The court
found that a disparity in knowledge can also weigh in favor of
imposing a duty because the party with more knowledge of the
potential danger is in a better position and has more control to
prevent or warn of the danger.280

United States Youth Soccer Ass’n, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 565.
Regents, 413 P.3d at 668 (finding dependence on “structure, guidance, and a safe
learning environment”).
277 Id. (quoting Peterson v. S.F. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 685 P.2d 1193, 1201 (Cal. 1984).
278 Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church, 763 P.2d 948, 956–57 (Cal. 1988).
279 Conti v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 42–43
(Ct. App. 2015).
280 Regents, 413 P.3d at 672. The court also found, more generally, that the
institution had “the power to influence [students’] values, their consciousness, their
relationships, and their behaviors.” Id. at 668.
275
276
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Lastly, to analyze the burden on the institution and
consequences to the community of imposing a duty, the court
should consider the connection between the institution’s
protective measures (or lack thereof) and the injury suffered by
the child, the scope or boundaries of the duty being imposed, the
existence of policies and practices already in place within the
institution, and the benefits received by the institution from its
involvement in the program. A recurring fact in cases where a
duty was imposed is the existence of a program or educational
materials designed to combat childhood sexual abuse within the
organization. In Juarez, the court found the burden on the
institution was minimal since it already had an effective system
in place to ensure its program and educational materials were
provided to the volunteers, parents, and children in its
programs.281 Similarly, in United States Youth Soccer Ass’n, Inc.,
the burden on the institution was minimal because it developed
its own child safety educational program and already
demonstrated an administrative ability to ensure compliance
with performing background checks.282 Likewise, when an
institution touts its educational materials and uses its safety to
advertise and encourage minor children to join its programs, any
burden imposed on the institution is minimal and can be
justified.283
As was demonstrated in the discussion supra, the simplified
three-factor test with the strong presumption of imposing a duty
can account for and reconcile with prior decisions by the court.
Many, if not all of the decisions, can be explained using these three
factors.284 Importantly, duties are not immutable facts of nature.285
Any time the court imposes a duty, they are simply responding to a
policy determination that a person should have a duty to warn or
protect in that scenario. “[L]egal duties are . . . merely conclusory
expressions that [sic], in cases of a particular type, liability should
be imposed for damage done.”286 Duty is a “shorthand statement of
a conclusion . . . [and] an expression of the sum total of those
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the
particular plaintiff is entitled to [legal] protection.”287

See Juarez v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 34 (Ct. App. 2000).
See Doe v. U.S. Youth Soccer Ass’n, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 3d 552, 567 (Ct. App. 2017).
See Juarez, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 32 (finding the institution was essentially
admitting education was an effective safety tool in its possession); Regents, 413 P.3d at
673–74 (marketing itself as one of the safest campuses raised revenue which lowered the
burden as these funds could be used to ensure a safe environment).
284 See supra notes 275–283 and accompanying text.
285 See Adams v. City of Fremont, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 196, 210 (Ct. App. 1998).
286 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 561 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976).
287 Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 916 (Cal. 1968).
281
282
283
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B. Justification for the Proposed Test and Impact on the Future
This three-factor test presents a logical combination of policy
considerations and factual considerations that the courts are
already considering in their analyses. The test simplifies the
court’s analysis by removing discretion from factors that can only
be rationally decided in one way. Additionally, this test is easier
to apply than the prior separate analyses for the existence of a
special relationship and Rowland factors. The cases demonstrate
that the court will sometimes apply both tests,288 or will stop
analyzing if one test was not met,289 and at other times, will
decide one test was sufficient even when had the court applied
both tests, its decision would not have changed.290 Having a
single test to use in these situations will lead to greater judicial
efficiency. This test will also allow for clear and straight forward
analysis, allowing for equal application, greater consistency, and
predictability in the courts. Consistency and predictability in
judgments, as well as uniformity, is essential to our judicial
system founded on precedent.
Another justification for this test is that the imposition of a
duty does not guarantee that an institution will be found liable
for its actions or inactions. While this test at first appears to
overtly expose institutions to liability, it is important to
remember that this is just the first step in determining
liability.291 Even with the imposition of a duty, an institution
must be found to have breached that duty, which is a question for
the jury to examine and determine.292 Thus, imposing a lower
standard to find a duty that exists in childhood sexual abuse
cases within institutions is justified. More importantly, the
application of this test will help proactively shape the behavior of
institutions. In recognizing the presumption that a duty will be
imposed under this test, the institutions will do everything they
can to act reasonably instead of doing everything they can to
avoid liability. In this way, the test itself helps safeguard
children in institutions before the abuse has even occurred.
Additionally, as organizations begin to implement better
policies, practices, and procedures that demonstrate limited

288 See Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 708 (Ct. App. 2019); Regents, 413
P.3d 656.
289 See Brown, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 708; Barenborg v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity,
244 Cal. Rptr. 3d 680 (Ct. App. 2019).
290 See Juarez v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12 (Ct. App. 2000).
291 See Adams v. City of Fremont, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 196, 208 (Ct. App. 1998)
(“Examining whether a legal duty exists and whether a particular defendant was
negligent are not coterminous exercises.”).
292 See Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 248 P.3d 1170, 1175 (Cal. 2011).
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exposure to claims of sexual abuse, the result will be favorable
insurance premiums. With clear standards and more predictable
liability, the costs of insurance will likely decrease for these
institutions. This also benefits the families and the children
involved in these institutions. With less money spent on
insurance and defending claims of sexual abuse, more funds will
be available for institutions to spend on materials, items, and
opportunities that further their ultimate mission and purpose.
With more resources, care, and education for children, these
funds will lead to better opportunities for children and further
enrich their lives.
Finally, this test provides the message that we, as a society,
desire our judicial system to effectively and consistently
communicate to our children: that children are valued and
deserve protection. By using tests that make it easier for
institutions to escape liability, we essentially communicate to our
children that we want them to participate in institutions meant
to help them grow and develop—but accept the risk that they
may be sexually abused. Even worse, we are setting an example
for children that those who commit evil will not have to suffer the
consequences of their actions. This proposed test will change that
narrative. It will demonstrate to children that we, as a society,
care for our children and recognize their importance in the
future. It will demonstrate accountability and a willingness to
hold people responsible for their actions. Changing this narrative
is imperative for us to ensure that our children grow into their
full potential and can, in time, take our places in society.
CONCLUSION
“The general feeling of the public that this problem does
exist in a threatening way lead[s] to the conclusion that people
charged with the care of children should guard against it[.]”293
The court in Brown was tasked with answering an incredibly
significant question. The Supreme Court of California’s decision
will have lasting impacts on both survivors of sexual abuse and
the institutions that have consistently failed the children they
were supposed to be protecting. Recent legislative and judicial
decisions demonstrate a recognition of the magnitude of the
problem and a willingness to take steps to correct it. Based on
the law of negligence and the cases interpreting it in California,
to determine whether or not to impose a duty, the court should
analyze only the factors of (1) the dependence of the child on the
institution for protection, (2) the control the institution has over
293

Juarez, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 31.
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the means of protection, and (3) the burden on the institution
and consequences to the community of imposing a duty, with the
rest of the policy factors automatically weighing in favor of
imposing a duty.
This test is easier for courts to apply, thereby improving
judicial efficiency and more predictable results. Most
importantly, the application of this test will shape the behavior of
institutions. In recognizing the higher likelihood that a duty will
be imposed under this test, the institutions will do everything
they can to act reasonably instead of everything they can to avoid
liability. In this way, the test itself helps safeguard children in
institutions. Time and again, our lawmakers, and society as a
whole, have stated the importance of safeguarding children from
abuse. This test recognizes the importance of giving both
meaning and real action to those words. The court’s decision in
Brown to stop the analysis when the special relationship factors
are not met, without taking into account the Rowland policy
considerations, is a major setback to the goal of protecting
children within institutions. Instead of fully considering all the
policy reasons why institutions should be responsible for the
children they invite to participate and benefit from, the court
refuses to impose a duty based on a limited and incomplete set of
factors. As has happened too often, the court’s words were
rendered meaningless by its actions.

